Food Security and the occupied Palestinian territories
Feroze Sidhwa recently spent his elective in the occupied Palestinian territories. Here he discusses the food insecurity issues there
The Israel Defense Forces (the army of the State of Israel) invaded and occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem (the occupied Palestinian territories; oPt) in June 1967. Since then Israel has maintained a military occupation in those territories, with policies that have led to “de-development”, the “structural[] and institutional[] dismantl[ing of] the Palestinian economy…”(1) This has led to the recent sharp rise in food insecurity in the oPt. Please note that in the article, “Palestinian”, “Palestinians”, etc. refers only to the Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territories.
Current food security status
The World Food Program (WFP) reported in January 2007 that 34% of Palestinian households are food secure, 20% are marginally secure, 12% are vulnerable to food insecurity, and 34% are food insecure.(2) As of November 2006, 40.2% of Palestinian households lived in “deep poverty” (daily per capita consumption of less than $2.10); in Gaza the figure is 79.8%. The first half of 2006 saw a 38.3% increase in the number of Palestinian households in deep poverty. (3)
In 2004 the World Bank estimated that per capita food consumption declined some 25% in real terms compared to 1999. (4) The decline in food consumption continued, with a further decline of 8% in the first half of 2006 alone. (2)
The consequences have been severe and will likely have long-term effects on Palestinian children’s development. In 2004 wasting reached 1.9%; stunting 9.9%; and vitamin A deficiency in children 12-59 months reached 22%. (2) 50.5% of West Bank children under 24 months and 71.9% of Gazan children 9-12 months are anaemic. (5) According to UNICEF, “one in ten children is stunted, one in two is anemic, and 75 per cent of children under the age of five suffer from vitamin A deficiency and low birth weight rates are as high as 8.2%…” (6)
The observed vitamin A deficiency and anemia “are considered by WHO international standards as a severe public health situation…” The observed rise in malnutrition status is due to decreased food consumption and decreased quality of consumed food over at least the past eight years. (2)
Food insecurity as a consequence of economic de-development
Palestinian food insecurity is highly correlated with the long-term intensity of Israel’s closure regime (severe restriction on freedom of movement within the oPt; see http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/InsertMap_Fragmentation_May07-withCheckpoint.pdf ), the extent of land confiscation, the attendant destruction of assets and infrastructure, and loss of income. (2) Closure and physical destruction of Palestinian economic infrastructure are both core policies of the occupation and lead directly to de-development.(1)
In December 2002 Palestinian gross national income (GNI) losses “reached some US$5.2 billion in 27 months - when one considers that GNI was estimated at US$5.4 billion in 1999, the opportunity cost of the crisis represents almost one entire year of Palestinian wealth creation. Cumulated raw physical damage [from September 2000 to December 2002] has jumped in the last year to some US$930 million, and lost investment to US$3.2 billion.” (7) The UN Conference on Trade and Development reports the loss “of up to one third of the existing physical capital and productive capacity” of the oPt. (8) Real per capita GDP declined another 10 percent in the first half of 2006 alone. (3)
The Word Food Program (WFP) lists nine major risk factors predisposing Palestinian households to food insecurity. (2) Similarly, a joint European Union and UN Food and Agriculture Organization report lists eight reasons for the increasing cost of food. (9) In each risk model, all but one risk factor is due to occupation policies.
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports closure and fragmentation by Israeli settlements and settlement-related infrastructure “is at the root of the West Bank’s declining economy…. Unless the problems caused by the existence and expansion of the settlements are addressed, the dismal humanitarian outlook for Palestinians will intensify.” (10) Several World Bank reports affirm this judgment. (4, 7, 11)
Roy describes the core policies of de-development as “measures designed…[to] fragment Palestinian society…to render it unviable…include[ing]:…introduction of advanced agricultural technologies concomitant with the steady confiscation of land and water; the introduction of refugee rehousing programs together with the establishment of Jewish settlements on Arab land; [and] improved access to employment in the Israeli economy in conjunction with prohibitions on the development of the domestic Palestinian economy (e.g. restricted access to international markets, control over all forms of indigenous production and over the flow of information, and consistently low levels of government investment in key economic sectors)…”(1)
Possibilities for improvement
Short of an end to the occupation, food security can perhaps be improved with food aid from the international community, but this will require Israeli cooperation on movement of food aid, especially into and out of Gaza, as well as sustained international financial and political support for such aid. Israel’s recent designation of Gaza as a “hostile entity” and US Secretary of State Rice’s agreement with the declaration does not indicate that either international support or Israeli assistance will be forthcoming. (12) Sustainable food security can only grow out of Palestinian economic stability and recovery, which are likely impossible under continued Israeli occupation and de-development. (13)
Feroze Sidhwa
2nd year medical student
University of Texas Health Science Center
San Antonio
USA
Sidhwa@uthscsa.edu
(1) Roy S. The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development, 2nd ed., Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies; 2001.
(2) World Food Programme. West Bank and Gaza Strip: Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis, Jan 2007.
(3) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Prolonged Crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Recent Socio-economic Impacts on Refugees and Non-Refugees, Nov 2006.
(4) World Bank. Four Years - Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis, Oct 2004.
(5) United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Humanitarian Monitor: occupied Palestinian territory, No. 15, July 2007.
(6) United Nations Children’s Fund. UNICEF Humanitarian Action Report 2007, 2007.
(7) World Bank. Twenty-Seven Months - Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis, May 2003.
(8) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Report on UNCTAD assistance to the Palestinian people, July 2007.
(9) EC-FAO Food Security Information for Action Programme. Strengthening Resilience: Food Insecurity and Local Responses to Fragmentation of the West Bank, Apr 2007.
(10) United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure in the West Bank, July 2007.
(11) World Bank. The Palestinian Economy and the Prospects for its Recovery: Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, Dec 2005.
(12) Israel brands Gaza “hostile entity” as Rice visits. AFP, Sept 20, 2007.
(13) Roy S. ‘A Dubai on the Mediterranean’. London Review of Books, Nov 3, 2005.
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